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O P I N I O N B Y : DURHAM

OPINION:
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] Appellants, Steve and Catherine Smith (the Smiths), filed suit against appellee, Mel
Frandsen dba Mary Mel Construction Company (Mary Mel), seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudulent concealment
after the footings, foundation, and structure of their home settled, allegedly due to improper
soil compaction and a general lack of lateral support.
[*P2] The trial court granted Mary Mel's motion for summary judgment, and the Smiths
filed a timely [ * * 2 ] notice of appeal. We affirm.

FACTS
[ * P 3 ] Iii tlte early 1990s, Mary Mel purchased land in Lehi City with the intention of
developing the property for residential use. In the period up to 1995, Mary Mel obtained
approval from local government agencies and constructed and installed the roads, curbs,
gutters, sidewalk, and utilities in what is now the Summer Crest Subdivision. On October 10,
1995, Mary Mel conveyed the properties, divided and improved, to Patterson Constn iction
(Patterson), a residential developer with whom Mary Mel had an ongoing business
relationship. Patterson, in +:.\rr. -onveyed a portion of the property, lot 223, on the same day
to GT Investments (KT\,
[ * P 4 ] GT is a licensed general contractor. GT, acting through one of its employees, Joseph
Sharp (Sharp), constructed a home on lot 223. During construction, Sharp "personally
inspected the . . . lot and viewed the condition of the lot before purchase and before building
commenced." As the Smiths assert in their complaint, despite the fact that "the soil [on lot
223] was so soft that anyone walking on it would leave an imprint," Sharp, allegedly as a
result of his lack of experience in contracting, [ * * 3 ] ignored this "red flag" and failed to
order any soils testing or other measures that would have revealed that the soil on lot 223
was inadequately compacted. After completing construction, GT delivered a warranty deed to
the Smiths on August 26, 1996.
[ * P 5 ] Since occupying the home, the Smiths have experienced "significant settlement of
the house, its footings, foundations and structure." In seeking recovery for damage caused
by the subsidence, the Smiths argue that GT "knew, should have known, or negligently failed
to determine that the House was built on inadequate soil material and/or inadequately
compacted soil." They additionally claim that in subdividing and developing the property prior
to its conveyance to Patterson, Mary Mel performed "certain excavation work . . . including
filling in a low area or ravine" running through lot 223. As a result, the Smiths allege, Mary
Mel "knew that the lot [included] unconsolidated fill, and failed to take proper steps to
compact [the] lot, and in fact concealed and/or failed to disclose these facts to appropriate
government entities and prospective purchasers." It is upon these facts that the Smiths
assert claims against GT, Sharp, [ * * 4 ] Mary Mel, and Patterson.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ * P 6 ] In reviewii ig a gi at.,
*., vve give no deference to u •
. • v. *•
with respect to its legal cono
^ Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 ... i 14, P 13*.
70 P.3d 35. Rather, we make our own •
on as to whether the record shows "that
there is no genuine issue as to any mate. i... i i md that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P 56(c). Nevertheless, we may affirm the result
reached by the trial court '"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis
of its ruling." Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, P 10, 54 P.3d 1 1 3 1 , (quoting Orton v.
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998)).
[ * P 7 ] f lary I Ae\, pui st jai it to Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), ui ges tl lis coui t to
uphold summary judgment, asserting that since the appellants have failed to provide a copy
of the summary judgment hearing transcript, "the district court's decisions are presumed to
be valid." However, Mary Mel misconstrues [ * * 5 ] the meaning of n ile 1 1(e)(2).
[ * P 8 ] The rule simply requires appellants to include "a transcript of all evidence" relevant
to a challenged finding or conclusion. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). In this case, neither party
claims that the missing transcript contains evidence bearing on the determination of the
case. See Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 775 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), rev'd ii
part and vacated in part on other grounds by Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 26 P3_d
193. Thus, appellants had no obligation to include the transcript in the record on appeal.

ANALYSIS
I Tl IEORIES OF I I <\BII I T V

.

[ * P 9 ] Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages against Mary Mel under three
different theories of liability: negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudulent
concealment. In order to prevail under any of these causes of action, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a duty running between the parties. For example, with respect
to negligent misrepresentation, we stated in Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d
378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967), that "where one . . . carelessly or negligently [ * * 6 ]
makes a false representation . . ., expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and the
other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also present." n l

voles

n l We clat ified this test in Price-Qrem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & G u n n e l l , Inc., 713 P.2d
55, 59 n,2 (Utah 1986), wherein we indicated that the suggestion in Jardine that "all of the
elements of fraud must also be proven is dictum. Although the cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation grew out of common law fraud, the elements of fraud need not be
independently established."

[ * P 1 0 ] Ordinarily, in order to prevail in an action for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiffs
must identify a "representor [who] makes an affirmative assertion which is false." Ellis v.
Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 1962); see also Baskin v. Mortgage & Trust,
Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. App. 1992) [ * * 7 ] (upholding summary judgment in favor
of a third-party lender who made no representations to plaintiffs in connection with the
purchase of their homes). Indeed, Mary Mel makes a point of claiming that it made no
representations, false or true, to the Smiths. The Smiths, however, contend that b>
conveying the property (jointly with Patterson) without '-dicating that the lot was unsuitable
for construction, Mary Mel effected a rom^c, •• - » r — <h.
>- * , -.,->^ * - „ ,--»~n
representation to then i
[ * P 1 1 ] Ii i tl le past, LlLuii v_dses I lave acknowledged tl lat "i tegliges it n lisrepr esei tidU.
form of fraud." Atkinson v. IHC Hosps,, Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990); see also
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) ("Negligent
misrepresentation is a tort which grew out of common-law fraud."); Robinson v. Tripco Inv.,
Inc., 2000 UT App 200, P 3 1 , 21 P.3d 219 (Billings, J., dissenting) (identifying negligent
misrepresentation as a "species" of fraud). Thus, interpreting the elements of the ton
i
manner consistent with principles of common-law fraud, we have found that in additio; •
affirmative misstatements, [ * * 8 ] an omission may be actionable as a negligent
misrepresentation where the defendant has a duty to disclose. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980) ("Misrepresentation may be made either by
affirmative statement or by material omission, where there exists a duty to speak."); DeBry
v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 fUtah Ct. App. 1992) (denying liability for an
"implied" misrepresentation where the defendant mortgage company owed no duty tcdisclose information to purchasers of real property). Thus, a duty to d r r ^ s e ^ ;> -eo:;••—-:element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation,

[*P12] Ii i additioi i, it is well establish led ii i oui law tl lat "without a uuiy, v : •

..

.. J

negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment is appropriate." T a l l m a : \ , , City ui

Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, P 5, 985 P.2d 892 (quoting Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 19941). Finally, in order to establish fraudulent
concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information [ * * 9 ] is known to the party failing
to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT
52, P 24, 48 P.3d 2 3 5 : see also Fennel! v. Green, 2003 UT App. 2 9 1 , P 10, 77 P.3d 339:
McDouqal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Fraudulent concealment
requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or
otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him"). Therefore, a duty to disclose is
material to each of the alleged causes of action.
[ * P 1 3 ] The pivotal question in this case is thus whether Mary Mel owed a duty to disclose
the nature and existence of any subsurface defects, not only to its immediate successors in
title, Patterson and GT, but also to the subsequent and more remote purchasers, the Smiths.
n2
Footnotes

n2 Because we find the resolution of this issue dispositive of the case, we decline to address
the merits of Mary Mel's alternative argument that the Smith's allegation of negligent
misrepresentation is barred by the economic loss rule.

End Footnotes

[**10]

I I . DUTY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS TO REMOTE PURCHASERS
A. Defining the Limits of a Developer's Duty
[ * P 1 4 ] "The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be determined
by the court." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Courts consider many factors,
none of which is dispositive, in determining when a duty runs between parties. Debry v.
Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d, 1000, 1007 ("A duty to speak will be found from 'all the
circumstances of the case and by comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end
in view by the contracting parties.'" (quoting Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d
802, 804 (Utah 1963) (citation omitted))). n3
Footnotes

n3 See e.g., Price-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 60 (foreseeability); Christenson v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 19831 (privity of contract); Ellis
v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Utah 1962) (statutory obligations); House v.
Armour of A m . , Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 549-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (whether user possesses
special knowledge, sophistication, or expertise).

-

End Footnotes

[**11]

[ * P 1 5 ] Particularly in the realm of tort law, "the duty c o n c e p t . . . is a policy
determination." Debry, 835 P.2d at 1003-04 ("Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.") (citations omitted). For example, policy was
one factor motivating our decision in Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah
1987), adopting the position of the Wyoming Supreme Court extending the duty of disclosure

to developers engaged in subdividing and improving lots for residential purposes. In
Anderson v. Bauer, upon which Loveland relies, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed that
"as we developed from a rural to an urban society, . . . builders constructing great numbers
of houses acquired considerable knowledge and expertise in the area and used engineering
services and studies to determine soil conditions . . . and other questions concerning
suitability for construction." 681 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Wyo. 19841. n4
Footnotes
n4 See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) ("The average
purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of
the component parts of a residential structure.").
End Footnotes

-

[**12]

[*P16] Therefore, in order to protect unsophisticated purchasers, under Loveland, a
developer, subdivider or person performing similar tasks has
a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable
for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must
disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. He has a
further duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course
of the subdivision process which is relevant to the suitability of the land for its
expected use.

Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. n5
- Footnotes
n5 See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo, 1979) ("The average
purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of
the component parts of a residential structure.").
End Footnotes- [*P17] Notwithstanding our holding in Loveland [ * * 1 3 ] , the duties owed by contractors
and developers are not without limitation. Even where a duty is found to exist, it does not
continue indefinitely. Absent intentional fraud, "it continues only until the vendee, or his
successor, have had adequate time and opportunity, through occupation of the land or
otherwise, to discover the existence of the condition, and to take effective precautions
against it by repair or other means." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt. g (1965). n6
Thus, the duties running from vendor to vendee and subvendee persist only until a
subsequent purchaser knows or should know of the defect in the property.
Footnotes
n6 See also House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

(recognizing the "sophisticated user doctrine" whereby the manufacturer of a product is
relieved of a duty to warn of the inherent dangers associated with a product if the purchaser
is a sophisticated user and is charged with knowledge of the product); see generally Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-11-17 (2000) (relieving real estate vendors of
liability where "it is proved that the purchaser knew of the [vendor's] untruth or omission.");
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 388 (1965); id. § 353 (a vendor of real property is only
liable for failing to disclose conditions on real property if the "the vendee does not know or
have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and the v e n d o r . . . has reason to
believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk").

End Footnotes

[**14]

B. Application to the Facts
[ * P 1 8 ] In this case, there is no dispute that Mary Mel conveyed the property to Patterson
and then to GT. GT is a licensed general contractor in the state of Utah, and like developers,
the law imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of specialized knowledge and
expertise with regard to residential construction. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398
A.2d 1283, 1292 ( N J . 1979) ("Whether the builder be large or small, the purchaser relies
upon his superior knowledge and skill, and he impliedly represents that he is qualified to
erect a habitable dwelling. He is also in a better position to prevent the existence of major
defects."); Groff v. Pete Kinqslev Bidq., Inc., 374 Pa. Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128, 133 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) ("The professional builder is expected to have the skill and expertise to
know how to guard against potential structural problems. Moreover, the builder is in the best
position to prevent structural defects."); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735
(Wyo. 1979) ("Consumer protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely
on the skill of [ * * 1 5 ] the builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably
fit for its intended use.").
[ * P 1 9 ] In particular, builder-contractors are expected to be familiar with conditions in the
subsurface of the ground. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 2 1 , 377 P.2d 889, 8 9 1 , 27 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963) (holding a residential contractor negligent where "a reasonably prudent
person under like or similar circumstances and as a result of making said excavations for
foundation footings would have discovered the insufficient compaction of the underlying earth
material, and would have caused soil tests and investigations to be made before proceeding
with the building"); Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal.Rptr. 689, 697 (Cal, App.
1968) (finding a contractor was negligent for "constructing [a] house upon unstable and filled
ground, containing an underground spring, without taking protective steps for providing
adequate drainage"); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 938 (Wyo. 1981) ("We
hold this to be the duty of ABC as builders to appellees: To furnish a safe location for a
residential structure, and it may [ * * 1 6 ] be negligence to not do so"). See generally
Annotation, Duty of Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects in Subsurface Conditions, 73
A.LR.3d 1213 (1976) (collecting cases from various jurisdictions in which "it was held that a
contractor who knows, or should know, of a defect in a particular subsoil does not perform
his contractual obligations in a workmanlike manner if he fails to notify the owner of the
existence of the condition").
[ * P 2 0 ] The facts indicate that Sharp, the GT employee supervising the excavation and
placement of the Smith's foundation, had "no prior construction experience." Nevertheless,
GT is deemed to possess the knowledge of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor under
similar circumstances, and, as a matter of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have
discovered the insufficient compaction on lot 223. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186
Conn. 370, 441 A.2d 620, 624 (Conn. 1982); Foust v. McKniqht 675 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) ("[A] vendor-builder of a residence is considered to be a manufacturer, and
as such he cannot avoid the conclusively presumptive knowledge of the defects in [ * * 1 7 ]

the thing he manufactures.") (citations omitted); Schamens v. Crow, 326 So. 2d 621, 626
(La. Ct. App. 1975) (same); George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett, 582 So. 2d 387, 393 (Miss.
1991); March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 894-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (imputing knowledge
of faulty construction to residential builder). In addition, the Smiths themselves allege in
their complaint that GT "knew, should have known, or negligently failed to determine that
[their] house was built on inadequate soil material and/or uncompacted fill."
[*P21] The parties agree that Mary Mel conveyed the property to Patterson and GT, both
parties who, as a matter of law, possessed superior knowledge and expertise regarding the
subsurface conditions on lot 223. Where a developer conveys property to a residential
contractor, the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and the independent duties owed
thereby, interrupt certain obligations running from the initial developer to subsequent
purchasers. In other words, borrowing from the language of the Restatement, we find that by
conveying to one having "adequate time and opportunity" to discover the subsurface
defects [ * * 1 8 ] in lot 223, Mary Mel incurred no liability to remote purchasers of the
property as a matter of law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt. g (1965). Mary
Mel had no duty extending beyond its conveyance to Patterson and GT, to both of which the
law imputes a high degree of knowledge and expertise. n7
Footnotes
n7 In doing so we do not address the merits of any suit involving Patterson, GT and the
Smiths or between Mary Mel and GT.
End Footnotes
[*P22] The present case is distinguishable from those relied upon by the Smiths. For
example, in Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina, 255 S.C. 517,
180 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971), the South Carolina Supreme Court found a developer had a duty
to disclose to a subsequent purchaser that "in developing and subdividing its land into lots to
be sold for residential use only, [it] filled an enormous gully with stumps and other rubble to
a depth of twenty to twenty-five feet and concealed this fill by covering [ * * 1 9 ] it with soil."
Id. at 208. However, when that case was decided in 1971, builder-contractors were not
universally held to the same high standards that they are today. As the cases cited above
indicate, the adoption of builder-contractor liability is a fairly recent phenomenon. n8 See
Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 657 n.2 (Fla. 1983) (documenting a trend beginning in
the late 1960s and extending through the early 1980s whereby builder-vendors were held
liable to immediate purchasers under an implied warranty of habitability).
Footnotes

-

n8 Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979), also relied on by the Smiths, is
inapposite because it involves a suit brought by residential contractors, rather than
homeowners, against a developer.
- - End Footnotes
[*P23] Appellants also point to Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984). In that
case, the court placed primary responsibility on builders and contractors to ensure the
suitability of the land for construction of residences. [ * * 2 0 ] There, the lots at issue were
suitable for some form of dwelling house, although some of the lots were admittedly unfit for
homes with basements. Id. at 1323. But, as the court observed, "whether the particular

house to be built was a house with no basement, a half basement, a tri-level house, or a full
basement was a decision not involving the developer." I d . Therefore, the court relied on the
knowledge and judgment of the builder in finding that the developer had satisfied his duty
and was not liable to homeowners. Likewise, our decision today requires contractors to be
accountable, either directly or through explicit warranties from their predecessors in title, for
the suitability of the land upon which they build.
[ * P 2 4 ] Those cases that do find developers liable to remote purchasers involve factual
settings in which the developer was also the builder-contractor or otherwise include a chain
of title with no intermediate sophisticated purchaser. See Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133
Cal. App. 3d 1 7 1 . 183 Cal.Rptr. 8 8 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982V, Washington Rd. Developers, LLC v.
Weeks, 249 Ga. App. 582, 549 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001V T * * 2 1 1 Moxley v. Laramie
Builders. Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979V
C. Policy Implications
[ * P 2 5 ] Our holding today furthers the purposes and policies underlying the recognized
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and is not inconsistent with our prior caselaw on
duty issues generally, or Utah statutes. As a result of their superior knowledge, residential
home-builders in other jurisdictions have consistently been held liable to subsequent as well
as immediate purchasers. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1 0 4 1 , 1044-45
(Colo. 1983) (citing cases from eight different states in which subsequent purchasers were
held able to state a claim for negligence against a builder); see also Timothy E. Travers,
American Law of Products Liability § 38:19 (3d ed. 1987); Michael A. DeSabatino, Liability of
Builder of Residence for Latent Defects Therein as Running to Subsequent Purchasers from
Original Vendee, 10 A.L.R. 4th 385 (2004). Just as the lack of purchaser sophistication
motivated the initial exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the expansion of buildercontractor liability to encompass even remote purchasers [ * * 2 2 ] is similarly driven. Like
initial consumers of residential construction, subsequent homeowners typically possess no
greater sophistication that would enable them to discover latent defects in the property.
Tusch Enters, v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022, 1034 (Idaho 1987) ("The same policy
considerations that lead to [our adoption of the implied warranty of habitability for sales of
new homes] . . . are equally applicable to subsequent homebuyers.'" (quoting Richards v.
Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984))); see also Dwight F.
Hopewell, C. Oates v. Jag: Let the Buyer B e w a r e - A Remedy for Subsequent Purchasers of
Homes in North Carolina, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1485, 1493 (1986) ("[A] subsequent purchaser of
real estate is in a very similar position to that of the initial purchaser. Both are innocent
purchasers who lack the expertise and knowledge necessary to uncover every latent d e f e c t .
. . . Thus, both classes of purchasers deserve equal protection").
[ * P 2 6 ] By implication, where a subsequent purchaser is not similarly situated but rather
possesses some unique insight or information [ * * 2 3 ] with respect to the property, liability
may not be extended to subsequent purchasers. See Tusch Enters., 740 P.2d at 1038
(Shepard, J., dissenting) (arguing that liability should be denied where "the plaintiffs . . . are
not unknowing buyers of a residence built by an unscrupulous builder/developer[.] Rather,
plaintiffs are a sophisticated and knowledgeable group of investors in real estate"). As the
cases cited above indicate, residential builders and contractors are not innocent transferees
occupying the same position as the ultimate residential consumer. Extending the liability of
developers beyond builder-contractors to encompass remote purchasers is inconsistent with
the rationale upon which recovery by subsequent purchasers was initially based.
[ * P 2 7 ] As a policy matter, we believe that our holding will encourage builders and
contractors to exercise that level of care consistent with the expertise legally imputed to
them. In addition, our decision preserves the contractual expectations of developers and
builder-contractors. If unstable soil conditions are known to both the developer and the
builder-transferee, the price of the land may be discounted to [ * * 2 4 ] reflect the added cost

involved in correcting the defect. See Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 1283,
1284 (Ind. 1991) (dealing with a property transaction in which a buyer "was given a credit
against the purchase price of [a] new lot to compensate [the buyer] for the expense they
incurred in correcting the soil conditions on the previous lot"). By requiring plaintiffs
generally to sue up the chain of title, the allocation of risk and expectations embodied in land
sale contracts will be preserved. n9
-

Footnotes

n9 It is, of course, likely that increases in costs incurred by builders will be passed on to
purchasers, but presumably those increases will be outweighed by losses avoided because of
higher standards in the building process.
End Footnotes
CONCLUSION
[*P28] We hold that Mary Mel's duty of care and disclosure extended only to its immediate
transferees, Patterson and GT, who "knew or should have known" of defects in the property,
and not to the appellants. The order granting summary [ * * 2 5 ] judgment is affirmed.
[*P29] Justice Parrish and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion.
CONCURBY: WILKINS
CONCUR:
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice, concurring in the result:
[*P30] I concur with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion that Mary Mel owed
no duty to the Smiths, and that as such a summary judgment in Mary Mel's favor was
proper. Mary Mel conveyed the lot to Patterson Construction, who conveyed to GT
Investments, who conveyed to the Smiths. No theory advanced by the Smiths supports
extension of a duty to disclose that far. The remaining analysis regarding the duty of home
builders to disclose subsurface conditions to buyers is dicta at best.
[*P31] We need not, nor are we asked to consider the duty, if any, running from a home
builder to a home buyer to disclose non-obvious defects in the land that may or may not be
known by the builder. To do so in this case simply extends our analysis not only beyond the
facts and law considered by the trial court, but also beyond the facts and law necessary to
resolve the case. There is no need for us to rely on the law of numerous other jurisdictions to
fashion a new duty under Utah law to [ * * 2 6 ] be imposed on home builders.
[*P32] As a result, I would affirm the trial court on the sole basis that the law imposed no
duty on Mary Mel to disclose anything regarding the condition of the property to the Smiths,
and that as a direct result the causes of action advanced by the Smiths against Mary Mel fail
as a matter of law.
[*P33] Justice Durrant concurs in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' concurring opinion.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Do issues of fact exist regarding whether the Defendant/Appellee knew of the
non-disclosed information?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: DeNovo. Because this is a question of
law, the trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed
for correctness. White v. Gary L. Deeselhorst. NP Ski Corp.. 879 P.2d 1371,1374 (Utah
1994).

1

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from a construction defect case brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants

("Homeowners") who purchased a lot from Defendant/Appellee ("Builder") and hired the
Builder to build them a custom home on said lot. Although notifying the Builder shortly
after moving into the house of certain defects, it was not until the Homeowners attempted
to sell their home in 2002 that they discovered collapsible soil beneath their house, which
caused substantial cracking and settling. The Homeowners then brought suit against the
Builder, claiming (1) fraudulent concealment, (2) fraudulent non-disclosure, (3) breach of
warranty, (4) mutual mistake, and (5) unilateral mistake.
B.

Proceedings Below
Homeowners instituted this action by filing a Complaint on April 27, 2002. On a

subsequent motion to compel arbitration submitted by the Builder, the trial court
dismissed the Homeowners' warranty and mistake causes of action so that they could be
arbitrated. Thereafter, on August 25, 2003, the Builder filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment to dismiss the Homeowners' remaining claims of fraudulent concealment and
fraudulent non-disclosure, which the trial court granted on October 10, 2003. The
Homeowners appeal this award of summary judgment.

2

C.

Material Facts
1. In March of 1995, the Homeowners signed a Purchase Agreement and Deposit

Receipt ("Agreement") for a house to be built by the Builder located in Lindon, Utah
("the House"). (R at 720, U 1.) (See, Exhibit A attached hereto).
2. On September 27,1995 the Homeowners closed on the House. (R at 720, If 2.)
3. Beginning in 1996 and into 1997, the Homeowners noticed cracks in the
foundation of the House, the basement floor and the driveway. Doors throughout the
House had shifted and were hard to open and close. The Homeowners discussed tehse
problems with the Builder in 1997 who, after their own inspection, told the Homeowners
to, "Don't worry about cracks, these are normal." (Rat 719, ^f 3.) The Builder was
"100% sure" of this. Id
4. Prior to the Homeowners' problems (i.e. within 30 days of October 24,1995), a
number of the Builder's other homes neighboring the Homeowners' House also
experienced similar settling problems. This included houses located very close to the
Homeowners' House (i.e. lots 305, 306, etc.). (R at 719, f 4.)
5. One of these neighbors was a couple named the Seawrights, who complained to
the Builder of cracks in April of 1995. (R at 719, If 5.)
6. The Builder hired AGRA Earth and Environmental ("AGRA") to inspect the
Seawrights' property. The Builder's Vice President (at the time), Brad Simons, wrote the
3

Seawrights a letter on October 6, 1995 telling them that AGRA discovered collapsible
soils two to three feet thick underlying the Seawrights' house, and in an October 25,1995
letter, Mr. Simons discusses piering the Seawrights' house to remedy the settling
problem. (Rat71946.)
7. In February of 2002, due to a change in employment, the Homeowners put the
House up for sale and soon procured a buyer. The buyer had an inspection done by Ken
Karren, who informed the buyer of the potential collapsible soil in the Homeowners'
neighborhood. (R at 718,17.)
8. Not only did the Homeowners lose the sale on their House because the buyer
backed out on account of the settlement issues, but it will cost them over $200,000 to
repair the House. (Rat 718, Tf 8.)
9. Mr. Karren explained in his report to the Homeowners dated April 23, 2002,
that "the large differential settlement present in [the Homeowners'] house most probably
resulted from the presence of collapsible soils." (R at 718, ^f 9.)
10. Mr. Karren testified that the Delta report "indicated that there was deep
collapsible soil... in [the Homeowners'] neighborhood." (R at 718,110.)
11. Thereafter, the Homeowners hired IGES to conduct an investigation into the
soils underlying their Lot. IGES' professional engineer Kent Hartley conducted soils
testing in April of 2002 on the soil underlying the southwest comer of the House and
4

discovered collapsible soil 27feet below the House. (R at 717, \ 11).
Facts Regarding the AGRA Soils Report
12. Mr. Simons, as Vice President for the Builder, purchased the land on behalf of
the Builder that later became the Panorama Point subdivision (and which included the
Homeowners' future lot). (R at 717, U12.)
13. The Builder purchased the land in three parcels. The third and last parcel of
land was previously owned by the LDS Church ("LDS Parcel'5). (R at 717, f 13.)
14. The Builder had a soils study done on the first two parcels only (and not the
LDS Parcel) by AGRA in 1995. (R at 717,114.)
15. The AGRA soil report revealed that there was collapsible soil on the two
parcels, which includes the Homeowners' Lot. (R at 717, % 15.)
16. The Builder never disclosed the AGRA soil report to the Homeowners. (Rat
717,H16.)
17. Bill Gordon was the engineer who did the various AGRA reports on the two
"non-LDS" parcels that the Builder developed into Panorama Point subdivision. (R at
716,1| 17). The Builder later hired Mr. Gordon to look at the Homeowners' House in
1997. Mr. Gordon provided Mr. Simons a written report, which recommends replacing
the footings under the Homeowners' home or underpinning it with a pier system. He
made clear that there were settling/soil problems. (R at 716,fflf19-20.)
5

Facts Regarding the LDS Parcel and the Delta Report
18. On April 9, 1992, the LDS Church, through its real estate representative
Blaine Livingstone, sold the LDS Parcel to the Builder. The LDS Parcel is adjacent to
(i.e. touches) the Homeowners' Lot. (R at 716, ^ 21.) (See, Exhibit B is a map showing
the Homeowners Lot (304) touching the LDS Parcel (labeled, "Panorama Pointe 'B'" on
the map).
19. Prior to the LDS Church selling the LDS Parcel to the Builder, the LDS
Church engaged Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. to conduct a soils test on the LDS
Parcel. (Rat715,f 22.)
20. The LDS Church sold the LDS Parcel to the Builder pursuant to the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement, a document typed by Mr. Simons. (R at 715, ^j 23.) (See,
Exhibit C attached hereto). Just above the signature of "J. Bradley Simons, Vice
President Woodside Homes Corporation" on the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, it
states: "Seller to provide a copy of the soils report [i.e. the Delta Report] previously
completed on the property prior to closing."1 (R at 715,fflf23-25.)
21. Mr. Livingstone discussed this disclosure of the Delta Report in the Earnest
1

In comparison, when the Builder sells a property, it intentionally does not use the
state-sanctioned "Seller Disclosure" form. In fact, the only written disclosure of any kind
that was given to the Homeowners at the time of their sale regarded "pressurized water
that came through the area," and had nothing to do with the bad soils underlying their lot.
(Rat 715, n8.)
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Money Sales Agreement:
Q:

Why did you have that in there?

A:

I wanted to disclose the condition of the soils for construction purposes.
We found it unsuitable for our construction purposes and I was aware that
The Builder would be developing and constructing on the site and so we
wanted them to be fully aware of the soils conditions they purchased, so
that there would be no liability coming back subsequent to the sale.

(Rat 7154 26.)
22. Not only did the LDS Church, through Mr. Livingstone, disclose the existence
of the Delta Report in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, but several pages from the
Delta report were even attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R at 714, f 27.)
(See, Exhibit C).
23. Mr. Livingstone further testified that the Builder was given a copy of the Delta
Report at the time of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Do you know if they [the Builder] were given a copy of [the Delta
Report]?
I do. They were given that.
At the time of this sale, roughly?
Yes.

(Rat 625-26.)
24. When the Builder purchased the LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the
Builder that there were problems with the soil on the LDS Parcel. (R at 714, ]f 29.)
25. The Builder knew that the LDS Church did not build on the LDS Parcel
7

because of soil problems. The Builder also knew of the Delta report at the time of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement:
Q:

Okay. So it says, 'Seller to provide a copy of the soils report previously
completed on this project.' You had been told that there had been a soils
report on this project?

A:

(Mr. Simons) We knew that there they were relocated because they had
found some collapsible soils. So we assumed that -

Q:

So you knew of that report?

A:

Yes.

(Rat 646.)
26. One of the test holes dug for, and discussed in, the Delta report was about 30
feet from the Homeowners' property. (R at 719, ^| 31.) (See, Exhibit C).2
27. The Builder knew that there was fill material on the Homeowners' Lot before
building the House. (R at 713, ^ 32.)
28. The Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church
thought there was collapsible soil underlying the LDS Parcel. (R at 713, ^f 33.)
29. The Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church had
told the Builder there was a soil report indicating collapsible soil. (R at 713, ^j 34.)
30. The Builder never disclosed to the Homeowners at any time and in any way
2

Exhibit C shows the Homeowners' Lot (no. 304) touching the LDS Parcel, and
the Delta Report test hole (in lot 205) which is 30 feet away from the Homeowners' lot.
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the existence of, or the contents of:
a. The Delta Engineering Report.
b. The AGRA Report
c. Any other type of written or verbal engineering reports from any time.
(Rat 7144 35.)
31. Further, the Builder never told the Homeowners that there were any soil issues
of any kind associated with the property, even after the Homeowners complained to the
Builder later about cracks in the foundation of the House. (R at 713, % 36.)
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court incorrectly held that there were no issues of fact regarding the
Builder's knowledge of the collapsible soil underneath the Homeowners' Lot because (1)
the Builder had knowledge of the existence of the Delta report via the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement it signed with the LDS Church, (2) and because it had knowledge of the
contents of the Delta report from its purchase of the LDS Parcel. Such knowledge of the
Delta Report means that the Builder has knowledge that the Delta Report discusses a test
hole 30 feet from the Homeowners' Lot that contained deep collapsible soils.
Further, the Builder admits it became aware of the contents of the Delta Report at
the time of the Seawright litigation which was still before the Homeowners contacted the
Builder with problems of foundational cracking. Thus, the Builder should have disclosed
9

its knowledge at that time to the Homeowners instead of assuring them that the cracking
was normal and not a problem.
Also, the trial court improperly weighed evidence by concluding that the Builder's
soils engineer's conclusion that the Homeowners' Lot was suitable for construction
controls over the data contained in the Delta and Agra reports.
Finally, as a matter of law, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a claim for
fraudulent concealment is inherently rife with factual issues and is thus a claim
inappropriate for summary judgment.
V. ARGUMENT
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment
unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." U.R.C.P.
56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is
not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the stronger case. Rather, the
court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
The nonmoving party is not required to "prove" its case in order to defeat a
summary judgment motion. Rather, the nonmoving party is only required to submit
evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.,
10

854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, "If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party
[and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's
evidence is to be believed for purposes of the motion, and if there is a conflict in the
evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be denied. See e ^ , Draper City, 888 P.2d
at 1100-01.
Based on this standard, and the evidence presented below, disputed issues of fact
preclude the trial court from granting the Builder's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

ISSUES OF FACT EXIST REGARDING WHETHER THE BUILDER
KNEW OF THE COLLAPSIBLE SOILS IN AND AROUND THE
HOMEOWNERS5 PROPERTY
In granting the Builder's motion for summary judgment against the Homeowners'

fraudulent non-disclosure claim, the trial court found that the "only issue in dispute is
what knowledge Woodside [i.e. the Builder] had regarding collapsible soils on the
Plaintiffs' [i.e. Homeowners] lot." (R at 900.) Knowledge is one of three elements the
Homeowners are required to establish to prove fraudulent non-disclosure, and a
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prerequisite to prove fraudulent concealment.3 Thus, for purposes of summary judgment,
the trial court held that the existence of collapsible soils was material, and Woodside did
not dispute that it had a legal duty to disclose such information. However, because the
trial court found that the Builder had no knowledge of the non-disclosed information (i.e.
collapsible soils beneath and around the Homeowners' Lot), it held that the Homeowners
could not establish the knowledge requirement for the two fraud claims as a matter of
law. This ruling by the trial court, however, is in error.
A.

The Builder Had Knowledge of the Existence of the Delta Report via
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement it Signed with the LDS Church

A critical document in this litigation is the Delta Report, which Delta Geotechnical
Consultants, Inc. drafted based on its soils investigation of the LDS Parcel. Based on the
Delta Report, the LDS Church declined to build on its parcel of land, but rather sold it to
the Builder Builder in 1992. (R at 716, ^| 21.) This parcel of land is directly adjacent to
the Homeowners' Lot. (See, map attached as Exhibit B). In fact, one of the test holes
dug for (and discussed in) the Delta report was located approximately 30 feet from the
3

"To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must prove the
following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal
duty to communicate." Hermansen v. Tasulis. 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002) (emphasis
added). Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or
obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material
facts known to him." McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997)
(emphasis added).
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Homeowners' property.4 (R at 669.) As the trial court already found there to be issues of
fact regarding the materiality of the Delta Report, and the Builder does not dispute that it
did not disclose the Delta Report to the Homeowners, the remaining issue is the Builder's
knowledge of the collapsible soils underlying the Homeowners' lot and the property
immediately adjacent thereto.
The Builder claims that it did not have possession of the key Delta Report at the
time the Homeowners purchased the Lot, and thus it had no knowledge of the collapsible
soils 30 feet from the Homeowners' Lot: "It is undisputed that the Delta Report was not
in Woodside's possession at the time Plaintiffs' purchased their house or at the time
Plaintiffs complained about cracks." (R at 531.) However, in the same breath, the Builder
admits that it knew that the LDS Church "decided to not build a large meetinghouse
because of concerns about the soils." (R at 530.) Also, when the Builder purchased the
LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the Builder that there were problems with the soil
on the LDS Parcel. (R at 714, ^ 29.) Further, the Builder knew of the Delta report when
it purchased the LDS Parcel. (R at 714,fflf30-31.) The Builder knew that there was fill
material on the Homeowners' Lot before building their House. (R at 713,1f 32.) Finally,
the Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church had told the

4

Exhibit B shows the Homeowners' lot (no. 304) touching the LDS Parcel, and the
Delta Report test hole (in lot 205) which is 30 feet away from the Homeowners' lot.
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Builder there was a soil report indicating collapsible soil. (R at 713, ^f 34.)
Additionally, the Builder has indicated its knowledge of the existence of the Delta
Report. For example, prior to the LDS Church selling the LDS Parcel to the Builder, the
LDS Church engaged Delta to conduct a soils test on the LDS Parcel. The report of said
soils test is the Delta Report. Attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which
governed the Builder's purchase of the LDS Parcel, are excerpts of the Delta Report.5
(See, Exhibit C). The Builder's agent, Vice-President Simons, undisputedly signed the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (which he drafted) on behalf of the Builder. Just above
the signature of "J. Bradley Simons, Vice President Woodside Homes Corporation" on
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, it states: "Seller to provide a copy of the soils report
[i.e. the Delta Report] previously completed on the property prior to closing." (See,
Exhibit C attached hereto).
Further, Mr. Simons even admitted that he knew of the Delta Report at the time of
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement:
5

Mr. Livingstone, the LDS Church's real estate agent for this transaction
explained that the reason he included the Delta Report with the purchase contract was
because he:
wanted to disclose the condition of the soils for construction purposes. We found
it unsuitable for our construction purposes and I was aware that Woodside would
be developing and constructing on the site and so we wanted them to be fully
aware of the soils conditions they purchased, so that there would be no liability
coming back subsequent to the sale.
(Rat 715,H26.)
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Q:

Okay. So it says,' Seller to provide a copy of the soils report previously
completed on this project.5 You had been told that there had been a soils
report on this project?

A:

We knew that there they were relocated because they had found some
collapsible soils. So we assumed that -

Q:

So you knew of that report?

A:

Yes.

(R at 646.) Nevertheless, Mr. Simons responds to the attached excerpts, the disclosure
language just above the signature block, and his own admission that he knew of the Delta
Report at the time of the Builder's sales agreement with the LDS Church, by claiming
that for some reason he just didn't read the excerpts of the Delta Report attached to the
Earnest Money Sale Agreement. And thus the Builder claims no knowledge of the Delta
Report at the time it contracted with the Homeowners. In other words, just because the
Builder supposedly chose not to read the Delta Report given to it in a variety of ways, it
had no knowledge. Such an argument certainly leads to the perverse incentive for people
or entities to disclaim knowledge of damning documents they might possess or receive by
simply claiming, ; I received it but I didn't actually read it.' At the very least, however, an
issue of fact exists as to whether the Builder read the Delta Report or not.
Aside from the factual issue regarding whether the Builder had knowledge of the
contents, the law certainly presumes the Builder had knowledge of the contents of the
attached excerpts to the purchase contract. In Semenov v. Hill 1999 Utah 58, U 12, the
15

court held: "The general rule pertaining to acceptance of an offer by signing is that 'where
a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that he did not know its terms, and
in the absence of fraud or mistake he will be bound by all its provisions, even though he
has not read the agreement and does not know its contents.'" (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§§ 41(f) (1963)).6 Further, signing and executing a contract imputes knowledge to the
signor of the contents thereof. Jacobson v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714, 721 (Utah 1949) (holding
that the plaintiff "signed and executed the contract as one of the parties and is [thus]
charged with knowledge of its contents."
Accordingly, although the Homeowners assert that the Builder had knowledge of
the existence of the Delta Report (and thus its contents) before it contracted with the
Homeowners and built their House, at the very least, issues of fact exist regarding the
Builder's knowledge of the Delta Report thereby precluding summary judgment.
B.

Issues of Fact Exist Regarding the Builder's Knowledge of the Contents
of the Delta Report From its Purchase of the LDS Parcel

Issues of fact also exist as to whether the Builder had knowledge of the contents of
the Delta Report. Mr. Simons testified in his deposition that when the Builder purchased
the LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the Builder that there were problems with the

6

Similarly, by recording a deed at a county recorder's office, the public is put on
notice not just of the existence of the deed, but of the contents of the deed. U.C.A.§ 1721-11(1).
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soil on the LDS Parcel. (R at 644.) Also, the Builder knew that the LDS Church did not
build on the LDS Parcel because of soil problems. 14 And in fact, one of the test holes
dug for (and discussed in) the Delta report was about 30 feet from the Homeowners'
property. (R at 669.) And, as stated above, the Builder knew that the LDS Church
"decided to not build a large meetinghouse because of concerns about the soils." It
cannot now simply claim that it knew about the collapsible soils nearby the Homeowners'
Lot, but didn't think the collapsible soil was that serious. The issue is, did the Builder
know. According to its then-Vice President Brad Simons, it knew.
Mr. Livingstone, LDS agent, provides further evidence that the Builder had
knowledge of the contents of the Delta Report. He testified that he caused a copy of the
Delta Report at be given to the Builder at the time of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Do you know if they [the Builder] were given a copy of [the Delta
Report]?
I do. They were given that.
At the time of this sale, roughly?
Yes.

(R at 625-26.) The Builder, of course, maintains that it never saw a copy of the Delta
Report until the Seawright litigation in 1995-1996, thereby implying that it never received
the copy Mr. Livingstone had sent. Nevertheless, whether they received it or not is a
factual issue inappropriate for summary judgment.
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At the very least, an issue of fact regarding the Builder's knowledge precludes the
Court from deciding this issue.
C.

Pursuant to the Seawright Litigation, the Builder Had Knowledge of
the Contents of the Delta Report Before the Homeowners' First
Complaints in 1997 to the Builder

The Builder, through its Vice-President Mr. Simons, claims it did not know of the
contents in the Delta Report until its litigation with the Seawrights (a couple in a lot
adjacent to the LDS Parcel and nearby the Homeowners' Lot. In April of 1995, the
Seawrights first complained to the Builder of foundational cracking. (R at 719, ^f 5.) In
October of 1995, the Builder hired AGRA to inspect the Seawrights' property. On
October 6, 1995, the Builder's Vice President (at the time) Brad Simons wrote the
Seawrights a letter telling them that AGRA discovered collapsible soils two to three feet
thick underlying the Seawrights' house, and in an October 25,1995 letter, Mr. Simons
discusses piering the Seawrights' house to remedy the settling problem. (R at 719, ^ 6.)
Presumably, the Seawrights' litigation with the Builder was sometime around the time of
this letter.
Compare the timing of the Seawrights' litigation with the Homeowners' discovery
of foundational cracking with their House. On September 27, 1995 the Homeowners
closed on the House. (R at 720, \ 2.) Beginning in 1996 and into 1997, the Homeowners
noticed cracks in the foundation of the House, the basement floor and the driveway. (R at
18

719, Tf 3.) Doors throughout the House had shifted and were hard to open and close. The
Homeowners informed the Builder in 1997 who, after their own inspection, told the
Homeowners to "Don't worry about cracks, these are normal." The Builder was "100%
sure" of this. IcL
This chronology is important because the Builder claims that the first time it saw a
copy of the Delta Report, and thus became aware of its contents, was "during the
Seawright lawsuit." (R at 646.) The Seawright lawsuit was clearly before the
Homeowners complained of foundational cracking to the Builder in 1997. Thus, by its
own admission the Builder knew of the Delta Report, and had even conducted its own
soils investigation of the neighboring Seawright lot (i.e. the AGRA Report), but failed to
disclose such information to the Homeowners when they began complaining of problems
identical to the Seawrights.7
Thus, even if the Court finds that the Builder had no knowledge of the existence or
contents of the Delta Report at the time the Builder entered into the Agreement with the
Homeowners, the Builder certainly had such knowledge by 1997 when the Homeowners
began complaining of foundational cracking. Accordingly, the Builder's failure to
7

Such a disclosure would have allowed the Homeowners to mitigate their damages
in 1997, rather than wait five more years till 2002 when they tried selling the House. It
would have allowed them to conduct discovery into the circumstances of the collapsible
soils underlying their house when memories and reports were most recent, available, and
fresh.
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disclose the existence and/or contents of the Delta Report (or the AGRA Report for that
matter) as of 1997, while informing the Homeowners that it was "100% sure" that the
cracks were "normal," was fraudulent, and precluded summary judgment of the
Homeowners' fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent concealment claims.
In sum, factual disputes exist regarding the Builder's knowledge of the existence
and content of the Delta Report, which, if known to the Builder, discloses deep
collapsible soils 30 feet from the Homeowners' House.
D.

The Trial Court Improperly Weighed Evidence By Concluding that the
Builder's Soils Engineer's Conclusion that the Homeowners' Lot Was
Suitable for Construction Controlled Over Conflicting Data Contained
in the Delta and AGRA Reports

The trial court concluded that the Builder had no knowledge about the collapsible
soils underneath the Homeowners' Lot, primarily because the Builder's soils engineer,
Mr. Gordon, indicated to Woodside that the Homeowners' Lot was suitable for
construction. (R at 899-900.) The trial court's decision thus implies that the Builder's
soils engineer's testimony controls over conflicting data contained in the Delta and
AGRA reports. However, in coming to this conclusion, the trial court compared and
weighed Mr. Gordon's testimony against the Delta and AGRA reports, which is
inappropriate for summary judgment. As stated above, when a court addresses a motion
for summary judgment, the court's function is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide
which side has the stronger case, rather the court's "sole inquiry should be whether
20

material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1100
(Utah 1995).
Accordingly, concluding that Mr. Gordon's testimony controls over the Delta and
AGRA reports is nothing more than an impermissible weighing of evidence. Thus, the
Court's award of summary judgment should be reversed.
IL

THE HOMEOWNERS5 FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT CAUSE OF
ACTION
Similar to its disposition of the Homeowners' fraudulent non-disclosure cause of

action, the trial court summarily dismissed the Homeowners' fraudulent concealment
cause of action because the Builder "had no knowledge of the possibility of remaining
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot." (R at 899.) The trial court's decision, however,
ignores Utah caselaw holding that fraudulent concealment claims are inherently rife with
factual issues that preclude summary judgment. In Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d
327, 333 (Utah 1997) the Utah Supreme Court found the determination of fraudulent
concealment to be a factual one, precluding summary judgment:
The application of this legal rule [of fraudulent concealment] to any particular set
of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact
We
explicitly acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct
in light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action necessitates the type
of factual findings which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of
cases. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts fall on two
opposite ends of a factual continuum: either (i) when the facts are so clear that
reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the
application of the governing legal standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts
21

underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or
insufficiently established that they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
concealment, with the result that the claim fails as a matter of law.
(Emphasis added). The trial court never found that the facts underlying the allegation of
fraudulent concealment were so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that they fail
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Furthermore, by its very nature, fraudulent
concealment (and, by extension, its cousin fraudulent non-disclosure) are highly factsensitive claims, inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, dismissal of the
Homeowners' fraudulent concealment cause of action as a matter of law constitutes
reversible error.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Homeowners request that the Court of Appeals
overturn the trial court's award of summary judgment by finding that issues of fact exist
regarding the Builder's knowledge, and remand this case to trial.
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EXHIBIT "A

P U R P O S E AGREEMENT AND DEPOSI" RECEIPT
T h i s Is a l e g a l l y b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t . If y o u d e s i r e l e g a l o r t a x a d v i s e , c o n t a c t y o u r a t t o r n e y o r t a x a d v i s o r .
1 This agreements made and entered into by and between Woodside Homes, Corporation, a Utah corporation ("SELLER - ), and £\LI S ,
(Collectively "BUYER") whose address
is'

[*yft('

phone

<

g>Q-

^ g & _ j E >

,

as Lot f^P'ot

0(2&\{\JU.

* ^ ^ o i w

for the purchase of certain real property located at
PfrKl0-(lAf*Ji-fetrX/ffeubdiviston,

^ 4 ^

&

entered into this_

clude improvements erected thereon in accordance with plan P&AWJj
*A"

# 4 0 - / 3 ^ /

— day of

UJ«L-.

elevation

work phone *>n

£3/^T>

\-

. work

also known

/##/£jajffgT^hlch

fir

? * r W

KL .

real property shall in-

.and options as specified on addendum

The lot and improvements shall hereinafter bo referred to as the 'Property*. Seller acknowledges receipt from BUYER of the Deposit
in the form of Cash ( ), Check (*^TOther ( ), which shaH apply to the purchase of said

Property.
BUYER intends to purchase said Property as a primary residence ( ^ secondary residence ( ), non-owner occupied investment property ( }.
2
DETAILS OF PURCHASE. BUYER agrees to pay SELLER for the Property the Total Purchase Price set forth below, to be paid in cash at dosing
In the eventthat BUYER is successful in qualifying for and obtaining the financing contemplated by BUYER, BUYER'S estimated monetary obligations at close
of escrow will be:
Base Pnce

$

'

Total Options From Addendum "A*

$ _

Total Purchase Price

$

/

-F^^j

'

< &

7**&

l&**\H

ffutj&l

tdeA*

^

15Dy CDO

H)

Total Purchase Price

$

Payment

•
=

Estimated Closing Costs

+f

Insurance, etc
Total Estimate of Cash Required
P F f. F t V E D

"~?

Loan Amount

Estimated Jmpounds forTaxeS|

ISP CttC\

X
V

/*"»^M

/ /gL~7 J

/7 o o
> * J»/

«

Deposit Paid Herewith

-

Start Deposit

-

Sl&O
jj

tfAR 1 3 1995
1

&C>&
5*~*^

Q&&

dan a
Estimate of Additional Cash
Required at or Prior to Close

- ,

TTf7

V

SELLER acknowledges receipt of deposit stated above BUYER understands, acknowledges and agrees that SELLER may retain this and all subsequent
deposits in its possession outside of escrow until or through closing. BUYER agrees that SELLER may utilize said deposits but shall in no manner be liable
to BUYER for any Interest earned on said deposits. 8UYER agrees to deposit additional funds with SELLER as follows
Pay the sum of f v Q g -

p M n l c f e A M n

7 /rg(S v S c ? o ^

) additional deposit on orbefore A P & l l —

11

19 9 S ^

BUYER understands and acknowledges that aside from the Base Price, Optional I terns, and Total Purchase Price, the costs andpayments set forth above
are estimates only. and shoutd actual costs exceed those estimates, BUYER agrees to bear that excess. BUYER understands and acknowledges that BUYER
will or may have to fund impounds at closing for future taxes and fire and extended coverage insurance and will or may incur costs for an appraisal, credit
report, loan inspection fee, loan origination fee, tax service, recording fees, escrow fees, mortgage insurance and other escrow and financing related fees
and costs which are estimated above. BUYER agrees to pay those costs and fees at dosing.
3
FINANCING BUYER'S initials shall indicate the provisions which shall apply to this agreement.
a
K / A—, BUYER shall pay cash without financing to complete the purchase of the Property, and agrees within 7 calendar days from
date ot this agreement to provide SELLER with evidence satisfactory to SELLER that sufficient cash is available to complete this purchase
SELLER agrees to a cash discount of
M-f^ % of the purchase price (no discount on options). This discount has been reflected in the
base price shown in Section 2.
.
v*
b )^gl~f
f v V BUYER shall obtain an FHA
, VA
Conventional. )C loan from Z.\fTM<^
/nC/&~t
(Approved lender), to
/
"complete the" purchase of the Property, Buyer agrees within * 7 , calendar days from the date of this agreement to make application for
a loan and withm ^fO days to provide SELLER with evidence of unconditional loan approval
c
jM / j i y - BUY5R will sell BUYER'S present property which is located at
kJj££K~
in order to complete tho purchase of the Property. If already sold, closing is scheduled
rVy^wat / V / / t —
title
company BUYER agrees within
f j / A days to provide SELLER with evidence that BUYER'S property has been s6\d^d scheduled
to close soon enough to permit BUYERS complete this purchase BUYER understands and agrees that SELLER will continue to solicit offers
on the property from other parties Should SELLER receive another otter, SELLER shall notify BUYER and BUYER shall have 3 calendar days
after such a notification to sell BUYER s present proporty and provide to SELLER satisfactory evidence of BUYER'S ability to complete the
purchase of the property Should BUYER fail to so perform, BUYER'S deposit less any costs already incurred by SELLER or Lender for credit
and appraisal reports, escrow fees or loan processing fees shall be returned to BUYER and BUYER shall have no further rightstopurchase
the property.
Should BUYER fail to provide SELLER with satisfactory evidence in a timely manner according to the provisions of this Section, of (a) cash
necessary to complete the transaction, (b) prompt loan submission and unconditional loan approval, or (c) sale and dosing of presenthome,
BUYER shall be in a material breach of contract and the terms ot Section 1&-DEFAULT, shall apply
4. INTEREST RATES ANO LOCKS Interest rates fluctuate an a daily basis. BUYER therefore acknowledges thatthe rate at closing may be higher, lower,
or the same as that which is available at the time this agreement is executed. BUYER acknowledges that any information solicited from SELLER or its affiliates
or agents concerning future interest rate levels, points, orwhether it is prudent to lock-m a rate is purely opinion and BUYER hereby agrees to hold these parties
harmless from any loss or action which may occur from basing financial decisions on satd opinions.
BUYER agrees that any lock-in of an interest rate with lender is done entirely at BUYER'S own risk and discretion. BUYER agrees to hold harmless
SELLER and any of its agent or representatives if final completion extends beyond any lock-in period that BUYE R may negotiate with the Lender. Any estimate
of a possible completion date solicited for the purpose of ascertaining a lock-in period, arranging for the move, giving a landlord notice, or for any other purpose
shall be and is understood by BUYER to be only an estimate and shall not serve to modify the delivery provisions contained in Section 6 of this Agreement
5 CONSTRUCTION The house is, or will be, constructed on the Property substantially in conformity with the plans, specifications, and change orders
on file and available for inspection at the main office of SELLER. Model homes, when available reflect the typical floor plans, workmanship, and methods of
construction, and illustrate possibilities for future interior decoration ad extenor landscaping However, houses will not necessanly conform to the model homes
and will not include decorator items, special mirror or wall treatments, special land&caping, patios, pool, special exterior treatments, drapes, or upgraded floor
coverings or tiles SELLER reserves and shall have the nght to make any changes or substitutions in the construction, matenal, fixtures, method or other
integral part oi anything to be contained in the Property.
CHANGES BY SELLER. BUYER understands that the house Is not being custom built for BUYER (except as indicated on the Addendum A executed
concurrently with this Contract and made a part hereof by this reference) Rather, the House Is one in a planned development which will contain many similar
or identical houses. SELLER shall have the nght to maKe such reasonable changes in the plans and specifications and in materials and locations as do not
violate applicable federal, state or local law and. to the extant applicable. FHA and VA rules and regulations
Lot preparation is at the sole discretion ol SELLER and SELLER has at its sole and complete discretion the method and manner of preparation, including
the removal of any trees, shrubs, bushes, cacti, or other natural growth, and at no time may SELLER, its agents or subcontractors be liable to BUYER in
exercising discretion in lot preparation Further, BUYER acknowledges that he has not relied and will not rely upon the verbal representations of the SELLER
or us agents relating to lot preparation and the location of improvements on the tot.
Lot grading shall be/has been performed according to FHA/VA or the governing municipality's specifications to assure proper drainage. SELLER shall
not be responsible for damage caused by BUYER'S alterations of lotgrades. Builder will notprovide retention between sloped lots unless specifically contracted
as part of this Agreement BUYER will work with neighbors in providing necessary retention.
BUYER understands that a construction site is a very dangerous place to visit SELLER strongly urges buyer to keep away from the property until after
closing Should buyer enter the Property prior to closing, BUYER agrees to indemnify, defend and hold SELLER harmless from any cost expense or liability
arising, directly or indirectly, out of or in connsctton with said entry. Including but not limited to physical injury OT death Buyer may be asked to leave job site
by seller
6 COMPLETION In the event that the Residence has not been constructed as of the effective date of this Agreement, SELLER agrees to take reasonable
steps to have the Residence fully constructed within six (S) months of the issuance ot the building permit from the local governing authority. SELLER shall
request the permits be issued as SELLER'S schedule and manpower allow. The specific date on which a permit, approved by the citv is actuaiiv K*mvt a*rf

at tho time of final inspection but a certificate of occupancy 15 issued BUYER shall accept the Property and complete the purchase
If for any reason whatsoever, except SELLER s willful default SELLER shall be unable to complete the construction of the dwelling and to deliver title
within twelve (12) months of the date of this Agreement in accordance with the provisions herein It is agreed that SELLER 5 liability shall be limited to the
return of payments made by BUYER and upon the return to BUYER of said sum this Agreement shall be null and void and the parties mutually released
with no resultant liability of either party If a national or limited emergency creates a condition whereby SELLER is forced to incur costs greater than present
est mates SELLER shall have the option of raising the selling price by the amount of such increased costs and BUYER shall then have the option of paying
th© sum of the additional emergency costs or receiving a refund of his deposit
7 INSPECTION BY BUYER BUYER represents that he is of legal age that he has inspected the Property and the plans and specifications or model
house and that the Property is and has been purchased by 8U Y£R solely as the result of such inspection The House shall have no extras or additions not
as set forth in the standard plane and specifications for said House except as set forth m Addendum A and any Addendums thereto SELLER HAS MADE
NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES TO BUYER WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH IN THIS CONTRACT By closing escrow on the
Property BUYER acknowledges that the Property conforms to the terms and specifications of this Contract
8 OCCUPANCY At closing, the entire purchase pnee less any deposits retained by SELLER, shall be delivered to SELLER ma cashier's check Tide
to the Property shall be conveyed to BUYER subject to assessments recorded covenants conditions restrictions easements nght-of way subsurface
grants reservations and nghts of and to water oil gas or any other minerals and hydro carbon substances
Signing of closing or loan documents does not mean that title has passed from SELLER to BUYER Title passes and possession is allowed when closing 5
completed and the deed has bean recorded until then the Property belongs to SELLER
9 SELECTION OF COLORS BUYER shall make all selections of colors styles and patterns relating to the dwelling and pay for all optional or upgrade
items selected prior to startof construction except that BUYER shall not be entitled to change any item which has already been selected by SELLER If BUYER
does not make all such selections within this time frame SELLER shall at its option (a) make such selections in which event BUYER hereby agrees to accept
SELLERS selections or (b) treat this failure to make selection as a material breach of the contract and proceed according to the terms of Section 11 DEFA ULT
10 CUSTOMIZATION BUYER shall not prior to closing install or caused to be installed by BUYER S contractors or subcontractors custom vanations
to the home without prior written consent from SELLER Any such customizations installed without prior wntten permission from SELLER shall be removed
replaced and or repaired by SELLER at the expense of BUYE R BUYER hereby agrees to pay any and all such cost within five (5) days of receiving an itemized
statement from SELLER BUYER SHALL NOT PLACE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE HOME WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF SELLER
11 INSULATION The home has been or will be insulated as follows
R Value of Insulation
Thickness
Exteror walls of living area (excluding garage)
Ceiling area
Second Story Projections over garage and exterior
f-\ 0?fcJ2JrnLJvZ'>
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12 DEFAULT In the event the BUYER fails to consummate this transaction or otherwise breaches any abligatan of this Agreement SELLER may
terminate the transaction and SELLER * further obligation to BUYER under this Agreement in which case the parties by placing their initials below agree
the SELLERS damages will be substantial but extremely difficult to ascertain and that all deposits then pa,*) t ^ E L L E R as set forth in Section 2 of this
Agreement shall constitute a reasonable estimate of those damages QiA^&/H\
/ B U Y E R [initials

SELLER & In

Should dispute anse between the parties hereto with respect to any of the foregoing SELLER sraflfbe entitled to hold and retain any and all deposits
and other sums m iis possession until resolution of such dispute
13 FHA AND VA LOANS If BUYER is purchasing the property with a loan guaranteed by FHA or VA it is expressly agreed that notwithstanding any
other provisions of this Agreement the BUYER shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of deposit or be obligated to complete the purchase of the Property
if the purchase pnee of the Property exceeds the appraised value of the Property for mortgage insurance purpose by FHA or Reasonable Value established
by VA The 8UYER shall however have the pnvilege and option of proceeding with the consummation of this contract wi thou tregard to the amount of the
FHA appraisal or VA Reasonable Value
BUYER and SELLER acknowledge that if BUYER qualifies for an FHA or VA loan Lender may reauire SELLER to pay a FHA or VA loan discount fee
SELLER shall not be obliged to pay a loan discount fee which aycaoric
^//^
—nornont f ^ / > > - %) of the principal amount of the loan If at the
t me of issuance of the certificate of occupancy discounted points do exceed [4"t / ^ - . % SELLEH may terminate this Agreement If VA is guaranteeing
BUYER s loan SELLER s damages for BUYER'S broach of the Agreement shall be as specified in the VA Addendum If FHA is insuring BUYER s loan then
the damages described in paragraph 11 shall apply
/
/
14 CONVENTIONAL LOANS SELLER shall pay loan discount fees not to exceed
* t / A - — ' percent (
/ V / 9 r ^ % ) of the pnncipal amount of
the loan Said discount fees shall be used exclusively for loan fees associated with a specific interest rate
7
15 ADJACENT PROPERTY BUYER acknowledges that SELLER presently plans to develop only those units which have alroady boon roloasod for
•ale and construction and has no obligation w th respect to future plans zon ng and development of real property in the area of Property BUYER understands
that proposed and contemplated residential and other developments may have been illustrated on a plot plan or other sales literature of SELLER However
notwithstanding any othcroral discussions or representations by sales personnel or otherwise SELLER is under no obligation to construct such developments
and BUYER should not and s not in any way relying upon the presumption that the same will be constructed by SELLER BUYER understands that no sales
person or any other person in any way associated with SELLER has any authority to make any statement contrary to the provisions of th s paragraph BUYER
understands that SELLER does not guarantee the existence of any view for the Property BUYER al6o understands that electric transformers duster
mailboxes telephone boxes and/or cable boxes may be located on the property and may not be installed until shortly before or after close of escrow
16 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (a) BUYER is aware that his membership in the Subd vision homeowner s association is required an d BUYER
agrees to abide by the Articles of Incorporation By Laws and rules and Regulations of the Association BUYER is further aware that the Property shall be
subject to assessments levied by the association and described in full in the Declaration of Covenants Conditions and Restrictions for the subd vision BUYER
acknowledges receipt of copie^ of the Articles of Incorporation and By Laws for the Associaton
R C C C IV T 0
A //^"
BUYERS s Initials (initial only if applicable to this purchase)
(b) BUYER acknowledges receipt of a copy of the subdivision Declaration of Covenants Conditions and Restnctions
r
_ _ _
BUY£R s Initials (initials only if applicable to this purchase)
M r\Q } J 1 3 9 ^
17 ASSIGNMENT PROHIBITION BUYER may not assign sell transferor hypothecate this Agreement nor his nghfe therein contained without the pr or
written consent of SELLER
18 TIME OF ESSENCE Time «s of the essence in the performance of the terms of this AgreemenL
19 WAIVER AND SEVERABILITY The waiver by the SELLER of any term condition or provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a waiver
ol any other or subsequent term condition or provision In the event that any portion of this Agreement shad be declared by any court of competent junsdiction
to be invalid illegal or unenforceable such portion shall be deemed severed from this Agreement and the remaining portions hereof shall remain tn full force
and effect as fully as though such Inval d illegal or unenforceable portion had never been part of this Agreement
20 LIMITED ONE YEAR WARRANTY SELLER warrants that all work performed by Seller tn connection with the construction of the House will be of
a quality which is standard m the industry in the State of Utah In conformance withrequirementsof the Utah State Division of Contractors Seller guarantees
all such work against defective workmanship and materials for a period of one (1) year from the date of closing Seller dunng normal business hours and
at its own expense will make any and all necessary repa rs or replacements provided such repairs or replacements are necessary as a result of defect ve
workmanship or materials and provided Seller is granted reasonable access to the property dunng said normal business hours Sellers obligations under
this warranty and under this contract are limited to repair or replacement No steps taken by Seller to correct defects shall extend the warranty penod beyond
the one (1) year penod This warranty ts applicable only to matters reported in writing to SELLER before the oxptration of the one (1) year penod SELLER
ni3kes no warranty or representation hereunder es to the presence or non-presence of radon or other naturally occurring hazardous environmental conditions
or to the ef'ec s of any such condition en the Property or Buy* TH S WARRANTY iS THE ONLi WARRANT APPLICABLE TO TH'S °URC fASE ALL
OTHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND HABITABILITY AND
WORKMANSHIP INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED TO
COVER THE PRESENCE OF RADON OR OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS WHICH EXCEEDTHE FOREGOING OBLIGATIONS ARE HEREBY
DISCLAIMEDANDTHESAME ARE EXCLUDED FROMTHIS CONTRACT This warranty is intended to protect BUYER from faulty construction and defective
materials used in the construction of the House and does not apply to defects caused by way of example and not as a limitation by normal wear and tear
insubstantial variance or defects the elements natural disasters or other acts or events beyond the control of SELLER or faulty maintenance operation or
abusive use Notwithstanding the foregoing SELLERS warranty shall in no event extend to any consumer product appliances air conditioning units fumacos
and water heaters and other products included irHtys transaction The manufacturers of some products used in the House may provide manufacturers
warranty SELLER has no obligation or responsibility for the manufacturer s performance and SELLER does not warrant any of these items for any other
purpose If a manufacturer s warranty has been issued to SELLER SELLER hereby assigns to BUYER to be effective upon Cloa ng without recourse to
SELLER all rights uodar said manufacturer s warranties as are assignable on appliances and any other consumer products included in the House
BUYER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT SELLERS LIABILITY WHETHER IN CONTRACT OR OTHERWISE IS LIMITED TO THE REMEDY OF
REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT, WHICH REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT IS SELLERS OPTION AS SET FORTH ABOVE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL SELLER BE LfABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY
DAMAGES BASED ON A CLAIMED DIMINUTION IN THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY NO ACTION REGARDLESS OF FORM A R I S I N G n i i r n c
THE TRANSACTION UNnpn TWIQ P H M T O A P T » A V QC o n « .~ ^ ~ -

' SELLER IN THE PROCESS OF REMEDY OF
OCCURRED UNDER THE WARRANTY fc-^\»ISIONS HEREINABOVE PROVIDED. NO ACTIONA GIVEN CLAIM OF WARRANTY SHALL fcif TO MODIFY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS WARRAVk r / WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS EFFECTED ON
BEHALF OF BUYER OR A THIRD PARTY. SELLER SHALL HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR'ANY CLAIM THAT IS REPAIRED BY BUYER WITHOUT BEING SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO SELLER AND ALLOWING SELLER REASONABLE TIME TO EFFECT SUCH REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT AS MAY BE REQUIRED AS PER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS WARRANTY.
This dwelling will be Insured by a nationally recognized warranty/insurance company. BUYER, by initialling below, acknowledges and agrees: (a) that he
has received and reviewed the specimen capias of the Buyer's Protection Plan documents; (b) That the "Approved Standards" as set forth In the
Protection Plan documents shall be the sole and exclusive standards applicable to the dwelling with the exception that the standards as set forth by the
Utah Department of Contractors shall prevail if \n conflict with the "Approved Standards* as set forth in the protection Plan documents; (c) that in the
event of any warranty claim of any kind BUYER will have no right to sue SELLER unless and until BUYER has filed a complaint with SELLER, in writing
to the SELLER'S main office Located at 127 South 500 East #600, SLC, Utah 84102, and followed other claim procedures as set forth in the "Protection
Plan" documents including procedures requiring informal dispute settlements; (d) That the provisions of this section shall apply notwithstanding any
provisions to the contrary in any other documents; and (e) that this section may be amended or modified only by written agreement between SELLER/
BUYER that specifically states an intention to modify or amend the provisions, of ,this section.
BUYER'S INITIALS t X ^ V T
)(
)
21. APPLICABLE LAW AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. The laws of the State of l/iah shall govern the validity, construction, performance and effect of this
Agreement. In the event that legal action is instituted by any party hereto with respect to the rights or obligations of any party to this Agreement, the prevailing
party in such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit to be determined by the Court
in such action.
22. NOTICE. Any notices provided for in this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be doomed given when either hand delivered (in the case of BUYE R)
to any party comprising BUYER or (In tho case of SELLER) to a person of reasonable age and discretion at S^LLFR's general offices. Likewise any such
notice shall be deemed delivered seventy-two (72) hours after the same is deposited in the mail to (In case of BUYER) BUYER'S current address as noted
in this Agreement or Jin the case of SELLER) to SELLER'S general offices as reflected in the then-current telephone directory for Salt Lake County.
23. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. BUYER hereby represents BUYER is not relying upon any warranties, promises, guarantees, or representations made by
SELLER or anyone acting or claiming to act on behalf of SELLER unless reduced to writing and made a part of this Agreement. This Agreement constitutes
the entire agreement and understanding be'tween BUYER and SELLER with respect to purchase of the dwelling and cannot be amended, changed, modified
or supplemented except by an instrument in writing signed by both parties. This Agreement supersedes all prior written and oral understandings between
BUYER and SELLER.
24. ACCEPTANCE. This offer may be accepted only by an authorized officer or agent of SELLER.
25. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS. The parties comprising BUYER acknowledge that they have read an understand the terms and conditions set
forth in this Agreement, received a copy thereof, and agree to the purchase of the Property atlhe price and on the terms and conditions noted herein regardless
of any oral statement which may have been made by BUYER to the contrary.
26. BUYER agrees that if a cancellation is effected after plans have been redrawn by Woodside Homes, BUYER will forfeit that portion ot the deposit
which covers costs of such work. Builder reserves the right to redraw or modify plans based on the options and changes that BUYER has chosen.
27. BUYER acknowledges that all plans, plot plans, and specifications must be submitted to an Architectural Control Committee, a Local Government
Authority and Woodside Homes Construction Department for approval. BUYER hereby agrees to acceptall necessary modification to drawings and plot plan
that may be required to comply with these agencies and departments. AH needed changes will be reviewed and accepted by BUYER. Additional expenses
incurred shall be borne by BUYER.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OR AGREEMENTS:
i F
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I have fully read and understand this Agreement. I offer to purchase the
property subject to the terms and conditions herein. I understand this offer is
not a binding contract and SELLER has no obligation until this contract is
accepted by the SELLER. The sales agent is not authorized to accept this
offer
ys;

Realtor Company
Realtor Agent
Receipt of the deposit specified above is hereby acknowledged and
presentation of this offer to SELLER i s being made by:

Q y > h C&zyu

DATE
B, CNJ personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearingjail
all
signatures to be mailed on

SALES AGENT REPRESENTING
WOODSIDE HOMES - SELLER

lflfl$A'.ChlFl.

loffi^

. by Certified Mail

and return attached hereto to the D Contractor OXBuyer. Sent By

RF.CEIVE0
H6F \ 3 1995

JfiA^1
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EXHIBIT "C"

VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, BLAINE T. LIVINGSTON have reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement to Sell and
Addendum to Earnest Money Agreement to Sell and know their contents. I am informed and
believe to the best of my knowledge that the attached copies of said documents are true and
correct copies of the originals.
Executed on May ^ 7

, 1997 at Salt Lake City, Utah.

y^pj^^tTi

BLAINE T. LIVINGSTON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Z7

day of May_, 1997.

NOTARY PUBLIC
/ v V
Residing a t : . ^ / / / ^ / / " fl^kf .
My Commission Expires:
twoTJMrrjHnatuc

•WBswua a
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HNEST MONEY SALES AGREEME

fsnd ''

Yas<X)

^ No(O)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

Anril o, 199?

DATE:

Woodside Homes Corporation, a Utah Corporation
ho undersigned Buyej
—
L
.u,.—.—
EARNEST MONEY, the amount o(
F I E R Hundred and no/IQQ
ri^lnfM
ha farm of
1
^r^T-o
nhpnState
/ fn_hp
rionrv; tfl&Hnpnn aocp;;.rj:£ir)pe
ch shall be deposited in accordance"with
applicable
Law.
odsicicJBerlty

kerage

.... . . . . . . .

Phone Number

;_-..-.# K//'

Received by mm

f

.

t j

hereby daposits with Brokarac

^OCUUQ

"

of offer

Z'S-X^

3.BBradlay. Simons, Vice President

• /
.
/
OFFER TO PURCHAS~
. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above staled EARNEST MONEY Is givci;n to secure
sec and apply on the purchase of the 'property situated at
c* F v M M h «»fl"
_ in the City of _ _ M n d o i 1
County of
Ut.Eh
, Utf
ijoct lo any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or olhat* easemsnls or righls of way, government patents or slate deeds of rocord approved by Buyer
ordanca with Section G. Said property Is owned hyPrtrp ' o f Pr^^ .
ttigfrnpj
IDS Hhnrrh
as sailers, and Is more particularly dascrib

i

/

ApprnximafcrOy L 5 f\r.r*<; v.nfhin t-hq prnpnsflri PanoCTmn Pninhn Phmn

#1

JHEGK APPLICABLE BOXES:
&^ UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

£>Vacant Lot

fQ Vacant Acreage CPOther
3 IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
G Commercial
• Residential
D Condo
• Other
(a) IncluoWd Items, Unless excluded below, this sale ahaH includa all fixtures and any of the ilems shown'In Section A if presently attached to tho propai
Tha following personal properly shall also be Included In this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to Title:

Nona

I

(bj Excluded items. The following Items are specifically excluded from this sale:

_~.„ _ , _

Norv!
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS, Seller represents that the properly Includes the following improvements in the purchase pri
^electricity
Jj?connecltKi
S^j public aewer ©connected
Owell
CPbther
t ©connected
2?aaplic lank
Q connected
<£3* ingress & egress by private easement
tQ irrigation walar / secondary system
^} olher sanitary systsrn.
{^dedicated road < Q paved AJ3*\^L~~,
# of shares
*
Company
BS public water • (^connected
D master antenna Cf prewired
' f 3 curb and gutter 0 - « ^ <*pi
O T V antenna
2 private walar Q connocted

MSJ^ natural gas

CPconnacted
CPconnacled

«

D other rights

LL

_L.prior to closing, ^ 1 shall nol be furnish
(d) Survey. A certified survoy Q)shall be furnished at the expense of
M/A
(a) Buyer inspection. Buyor has mado a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and S below, accepts it in Hs present phys
condition, except:
«.-,
L_i
.
.
——

•V
. -PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price Tor the .property Isl

*nn no

S J y . t y ''fi V 3 T h ^ U S ^ n d * - - »»
.) which shall be paid as falli
which represents the afaredescribed EARNEST MONEY D E P p s n > " ^
representing the approxlmaia balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.,
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by bi
which obligation boars intorasl at
% pat annum with monthly payments of $ j .
which include;
• principal;
• interest;
• taxes; • insurance;
D condo lser t
Q other
.
representing th© approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances \

L&*5QQJ0Q-

assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears Interest at
% per annum with monthly payments of S
_
which Include:
D principal;
D Interest;
D taxes; D insurance;
D condo foes;
D othor
roprosonling balance. If any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or setter financing, to bo paid a s follows:

.
:

tnJb?-. secured tav a 1st t r u s t deed and note bearing zero (QSO,_jntsresh. Rnloon,,
nThApavmght on Qece^bof 31 v 1992. RHVPT fn ffipyf-^n imrirnvrm^nhs. V i i t h n u t ^ j s i n a —
a degsrlopmant loan ofi ths subject property.
65 T 000,00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

outside financing, Buyer agrees to us« best c
Section F shall also apf ly) an
If Buyer Is required to assume an underlying obfigaiion (in
ygr quaUiying {or and Ien^ng instituiron gra/nting said assumption and/or financing. Buyar a
assumo and/or procure same arut its offer is made subjeel
days after Seile//a«)bepUnc/af this Agreement to oswflLb*^^
and/or obtain tha new (inane
maks applicalion within „Z!^z
days after Sailer's accap
Vo. If Buyer d ^ s nakquerrfy for the assumpifon and/orNKancing ^hhin .
interest rala not to oxcood —
.mortgage loan dis
ihis AgreamonL this Agroemenl shall Be voidable at the^?p\icn of ths Seller upon wrjj&n nottcc^allof agrees to pay up l o .

3, COND(T!PH*AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE.
N represents that Seller £[ holds till* to the property
\ simple © I s purchasing the property under a r<=
tie contract. Transfer^ Sellers ownership Inters*, ^fail be made as sat forth In Section S. Seller agrees to\w.,<<£h good and marketable title to the property, subje
ncumbranctfS and exceptions noted herein, evidenced bytf?fx a currant policy o( title Insurance In Ihe amount of purchase priceCCan abstract of UUQ brouoht eurr*
u 8
gLfi attorney's opinion (Sea Section H).
%
•
^
"
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall haw the opportunity to Inapeci the title to the subject property prior to closing, Buyar shall takB »
|ed to any easting restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R'a). Buyer Q has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R'a prior to signing thfe Agree mi
6, VESTING OF TITLE. Till* shall vest In Buysr as follows:
WocdcldC i ' l C T i ^ ' C o r p ^ a t i O f t , Q U t a h CQIpOratiuft
6, SELLERS WARHANTIES, in addition to warranties contained in Section C, Ihe fallowing Items are also warranted:.
Nono •
^
eptions to the above and Section C shall ba limited to tha fallowing: _ _ l c = 2 £ £ s i

:__

7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES, This offer fa mada subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which muai be satis

>r to dosing:
Approval of VJnocMrip Homes Roaxd-of Directors within 10 days of receiv^i^g
aocnnted offer hflck from Rftllnr. m rising frn HP» on HT hnforp ApHI ?a\ 1QQ9

-

J a r t r n prnvk)r> a rtony nP hhn . e ; n i h -p^p^rf p r P v n n n O y rnmp*|c*-t-pH n q *hg> p T n j > n t
J a r t o allOlV b u y e r t n s h n h w r i t e r , W H ^ T J gppnnrfory w a r ^ r t«n r h n prnp-vH-y p ^ r ? - » l;,n p j o ^ n g
a! a
. .•1199 .
0, CLOSING OF SALE, This Agreement shall bs closed on or before . SCO AhOVO
reasonable location to be designate*
ler, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer ahall deposit with tha escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete ihe purchase in accordance
Agreement, Prorations set forth In Section R shall be mada as of D date of poss^ssionR^ date of closing • other
,
.
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer en SJLC^> &iaau~g.
unlesa^actonded by written agreement of parties.
0. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At tha. awning of this Agreement Ihe listing agent
f ' \
represents ( ) Seller ( ) Bt
\ the selling aganl
t~/ljZXZ
represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. Buyer and Salter confirm, that prior to signing this Agreei
rten disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. {
) ( ) Buyer's initials (
)(
) Seller's Initiala.
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED A90VE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE E
CEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.

12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE.,
'© until
>NEY

TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller
892-

iyer. /

r

to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapae and the Agent shall return the EARf

^ •

^J?7 S
yfif's'SlpJ^aJareL^

(Dais)

500 F a s t , Mm,

S i r , Mt-frh

(Addles)

&U32

(Phone)

575-OMQ

(SSN/TA

fadley Simons, Vico President Woodsids Homes Corporation
rear's- Signature)

(Phone)

(Address)

(Date)

(SSNfiTi*

5CK ONE
I ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the Foregoing otter on tha larms and conditions specified above.
I REJECTION. Seller horaby REJECTS tha foregoing offer,,
(Seller's Initiate;)
I COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO Ihe exceptions or modidcalions &s specified below or In tha attachod Addendur
>rasents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall havo until ^//0&
(A^gjffi rA&m*&>~SS
<&%. , ™ p \ T , t* accept the
;peclfted below.

s?V-£&r/>r?s/

altera S i g n a W a ) ^ ( D a f e )
altar's Signature)

(Data)

^7 r/s/^^syS^s-m^

*^(Time)

fTlme)

(Address)

(Pnone)

(SSN/T

(Address}

(Phone)

(SSNH

•ISCK ONE:
] ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
] REJECTION. Suyor hereby REJECTS tho COUNTER OFFER.
(Buyer's Initials}
] COUNTER OFFER. 8uyor hereby ACCEPTS tho COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

uyer's Signaiure)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Data)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Stare Law requires Broker to furnish Buyar and Sallar wllh copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures, (Ona of the following alternatives must therefore be con
A. • I acknowledge recaipt of a final copy of Ihe foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures*

3NA7UR6 OF SSlXEfl

SIGNATURE OF SUYcH

HAY-15-97THU 03:28 Pil

™*CHURCIioF
JESUS CHRIST
"'LATTER-DAY
SAINTS
Property Number
Property Address

FAX NO.

P. 02

Addendum to Earnest Money Agreement to Sell
This is a legally binding document.
If not understood, seek competent advice.

April 14, 1992
519-2072
150 N 950 East, Lindon, Utah S4W2

PURCHASER
Woodslde Homes Corporation
c/o J, Dudley Simony Vice President
127 South 500 East, ^600
Salt U k o CUy, Utah 34X02
Phone # (801)-57S-85KW
Fed ID/SS # 37-032S7W

I'HgC

SELLER
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
ft Utah corporation sole

L
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. The eamese money agreement dated April 9,1992, and between Woo&side Homes Cnrpor-irion, as Purchaser, mi
Corporation of the Presiding; Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation sole, as Seller, for the purchase of the proper!
situated in the city of lindon, county of Utah, state of Utah, loiowa as (address): 150 S )5Q East, Lindon, Utah 54052, and described either on "Exhibit /»
aliachcd hereto hereto, or as sat forth below is modified and amended as follows:
XBS ncres more-or-Iess vacant ground* Legal description lo be attached. Set
attached plaL
Propcrry Tux Number 14-074-0022
IL

CONVEYANCE. The property shall be conveyed by special or limited warranty deed to Purchaser with title vesled as follows:
To be determined at closing..

III.
APPROPRIATION COMMITTEE APPROVAL. The terms and conditions of the anticipated sale ns set forth in the earnest money agreement ai
this addendum require approval within a reasonable time by the Seller's Appropriation Committee
IV.
DOCUMENT APPROVAL Alt documents must be prepared or reviewed by and receive the approval of the Seller's Office of General Counsel. Shot
receipt of such approval delay the scheduled closing dale, upon Seller's request Purchaser will grant Seller an additional 30 days' time In which lo close this s,
and deliver possession of the propcrry.
V.
CLOSING D A T U The closing dale shall be on or before the 15 day of May, 1992, and Seller shall grant possession of the properly lo Purchaser
or before i h e 1 day of May, 1992.
VI.

WATHR RIGHTS. Seller shall retain all water rights whether or not appurtenant unless specifically noted otherwise In this addendum.

VII.
KNTIRGY RIGKTS. Seller shall retain ail oil, gas„ mineral, geo thermal, and other energy rights. If the propeny consists of in excess of five (5) nc
Seller shall also reserve the right of ingress and egress for exploration and production of the oil, gas, mineral, geo thermal, and other energy rights.
V7IL
D £ £ Q P RSTRI CTi ONS. If Seller rcrains ownership of immediately adjoining property or if a chapel constructed by Seller if located upon Ihc prop*
Seller shall impose restrictions with a right of re-entry in the deed to Purchaser providing tha.c no alcoholic beverages or intoxicated liquor shall be roanufnciu
kept for sale, nor sold on the propcrry, nor shall a place of public entertainment or amusement be operated on the property.
IX.
CREDIT SALE. If the propcrry is being sold on credit, Purchaser shall provide, pay for, and maintain a fire insurance policy providing: at least D
Form coverage in ihc amount of nol less than 50% of the insurable value of the improvements included in the above described propcrry. Sellers interest
be protected by use of the standard mortgagee clause used in the area wherein the propcrry is located. The mortgagee shall be identified as:
Corporation of the Presiding EUhop of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
a Utah corporation sole
Finance and Records Department
Propeny No. 519-2072
50 East North Temple Slrect
Sail Lake City, UTB4 ISO
At closing. Purchaser shall deliver a binder of Insurance, effective for not less than 60 days, and showing Seller's mortgagee interest, Prior to the expirat
the 60-day binder, Purchaser shall furnish to Seller a certified copy of the insurance policy ftied in compliance with this section. Such policy shall ue iss
a company or companies, and oa a form or forms, acceptable to Seller, The term insurable value as used above shall mean the replacement cost
improvements less depreciation, and further reduced by such values as are normally excluded in fire insurance policies issued in the area in which the
described property is located* The InsuraDle value shall be subject to the approval of Seller.

CBIVEB APR 3. 0 B&

Apni w ; i » a
perry Number
perry Address

"rage 2

519-2072
150 N 950 East, Undon, Utah &4062

BT?qF.T,L OR TRANSFER, Purchaser agrees that it will not resell or transfer the property without Seller's written consent, v/hich may be withheld,
the parties agree that any approved sale or transfer wilt be subject to an assumption fee imposed by Seller as a condition for approving such transfer or
:, purchaser agrees to sign Seller's standard non-assumption agreement and to be bound thereby.
iJiTE PAYMENTS- If the sale anticipated by the earnest money agreement Involves periodic payments, a ia(e payment efcarge of 5% of each payment
II be paid by Purchaser to Seller far each payment received by Seller more than ten (10) day* after the due date for suctf" payment.
'A.,
D.

CREDIT RISK, A credit sale is subject to Seller's approval of Purchaser as a credit risk.
purchaser agrees to submit a financial statement with this signed addendum.
Seller, at its option, may obtain a credit report on Purchaser from a credit reporting agency.

II,

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS:

rchose price to be $8J),M,00 all cash at closing

[V,
ATTORNEYS FHE5. If either parry employs an attorney to enforce the earnest money agreement with this addendum, the party fa default shall p*y
prevailing party the reasonable expenses of the prevailing parry, including but not limited to attorney's fees reasonably incurred, whether occasioned by
igation or not.
e

/,
ENTIRE ACiRHEMEOT. The terms of this addendum and the agrecmenito which It is attached constitute the entire contract between the parties,
4 any modification* of this entire agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties. If there arc any conflicts between the agreement provisions imU
c addendum provisions, or the application of cither, the terms and conditions as set forth in the addendum, and the application of those addendum terms
d conditions, shall prevail and govern the entire agreement between the parties*

SELLER

JkCILUIift

"

Church Real Estate RcgpeScntative

'J-to&tifi'J&e \>^^^$^^^

jrehaser

4

Date

"FINAL APPROVAL (as per &cciob 111)

urchaser Signa6ucfr

Date

Corporation of the Presiding Dishop of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, a Utah corporation sole,

urchascr £xrgnature

Date

Authorfced Agent's Signature

Date

IBCKirT
*
—j
acknowledge receipt of the final copy of the fopegotng agreement bearing all signatures.
SELLER
Church Real Estate Representative

Date

tECBIVEB APR $ 0 Was

SECURITY T1T15 t ABSTRACT CO
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KINA E ROD UTAH CQ RECORDER BY AC
1992 m
i « : 0 3 Att FEE 5 . 5 0
RECQRBED FOR SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
Property #51^2072-61/92-50292
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah corporation sole, GRANTOR, of Salt Lake City,
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through
or under it, and against acts of itself, to WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, GRANTEE, of 127 South 50Q East, #600, Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, Stale
«
of Utah, for the sum of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, the following parcel of land, situate in the County of Utah, State of Utah, and more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point which Is North 151.51 feet and East 1,065.60 feet from ihe
West 1/4 comer of Section 35, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence along the arc of a 339.027 foot radius curve to the left 131.135
feet, the chord of which bears South 66* Q6' 24H West 130.319 feet; thence South 55*
01* 33* West 318.99 feet; thence along the arc of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the
right 23.562 feet, the chord of which bears North 79* 5ff 27" West 21.213 feet;
thence North 34* 58f 27* West 136.10 feet; thence along the arc of a 216.065 foot
radius curve to the right 130342 feet, the chord of which bears North 17° 41* 32"
West 128375 feet; thence North 0* 24' 37H West 66,50 feet; thence North 55% 01" 33«*
East 530,00 feet; thence South 12* 48' 44" East 381.68 feet to the point of beginning.
Basis of Bearing: Section line from West 1/4 corner to Northwest corner of said
Section 35 being North V 24' 37" West.
The Grantor specifically reserves and excepts unto Itself all minerals, coal, carbons,
hydrocarbons, oil, gas, chemical elements and compounds whether In solid, liquid,
or gaseoos form, and ail steam and other forms of thermal energy on, tn, or under
the aboy* described land provided that Grantor does not reserve the right to use
the subject property or extract minerals or other substances from the subject
property above a depth of 500 Teet, nor does Grantor reserve the right to use the
surface of the subject property la connection with the rights reserved herein.
Subject ta easements, rights,rights-of-way,reservations, conditions, restrictions,
covenants and taxes and assessments of record or enforceable In law or equity.
Together with and subject to an access and utility right-of-way, 5Q feet wide, 25 feet
either side of the following described centerllne to-wit:
l ^ M l n n i n o flf « nntnf n » *>.- ^ w f A ^ U * n7 14A WnrtK C ^ A f

T \i%Ai\* TU*fc " U

nnUt

ENT3?737

&K 2 ? 7 S PQ *<?»*

Lkdon Hills Flat EA* as recorded in the Utah!
said point i|Lib being South 153JI (eet and EasM57,
fitacir S|ct$&n 3 5 i - t o ^ U p S S&ustfi, Range ffeist; s 4 | J
thence along fat arc of a 95.1(53 foot radius curve to the ffj™
^. . -,,., , _ „
of wlUch bears Smith 6V 4P 32' East 88.525 feet; tlxente $Sffilr$r S f f ^ r ! #
20.1? feet to the intersection with a proposed street; thence North 55* 01'33" Bast
145.6113 feet Co the Intersection with a proposed str«t t safd 5ntlrsectWn being at the
Southwest comer of the 4-acre chapel site; thence NorittS$%m% 33* East parallel
to and 25 feet perpendicular Southeasterly from the South property line of the
chapel site 3$8,99 feet to a point which 1$ North 7824 feet and East m.n feet from
the West Quarter Corner of said section.
Basis of Bearing: Section Line from West Quarter Corner to Northwest Corner of
said Section 35 being North D4 24' 37" West. State Plan Coordinates of the West
Quarter Corner as established by Utah County Surveyor are North = 731,388.54
East *. 1,945,478.88
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereto subscribed its name and
affixed its corporate seal, by its authorized agent, this 19th day of June, 1992,
i%t
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CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Uiah
corporatkm sole

*
%

V

STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this 19th day of June, 1992, personally appeared before me Richard C« Edgley
personally known to me to be the authorized agent for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, who acknowledged to me that he signed the
foregoing instrument as authorized agent for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation sole, and that the seal impressed
on the within instrument is the seal of said corporation, and the said Richard C, Edgley
acknowledged to me that the said corporation executed the same.

/T/foy

Notary Public in and fat the
State of Utah
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TEST HOLE NO. 2
ELEVATION: 4 8 7 9 . 0
SOIL DESCRIPTION

TOPSOIL:

12",

Silt

SILT(ML) to Silty SAND
(SM), brittle, calcareous, occasional sand and
gravel, loose to medium
12/12 dense, dry, light brown
with white streaks
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m
M

SAND(SM), silty, trace
cobbles at 10-12*,
medium dense, dry, light
28/12 brown

16/12

EOTH @ 16.5'
No free water encountered
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TOPSOIL:

1 2 " SILT

SILT(ML), s a n d y , l o o s e ,
d r y t o m o i s t , brown
6/12
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SAND(SM), silty with
layers of sandy SILT and
gravelly SAND, fine
grained, loose to medium
dense, moist, brown
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EOTH -S 41.5'
No free water encountered
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TOPSOIL: 8" SILT
SILT (ML) t o s i l t y SAND (SH)
Trace g r a v e l , c a l c a r e o u s , l o o s e ,
dry, l i g h t bsawn v/ith white
deposits
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No free water encountered

11111

1 */

5»6-V»

AFR

Wl/4
r*N

i^, A « r * r *

f » •

»

aa

02/22/96

08:38

KMG ARCHITECTS

002

mMM

d

8

EXHIBIT "D

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALI S. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI,
Plaintiffs,
RULING
vs.
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,
and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Case No. 020402197
Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On
May 28, 2002, Plaintiffs submitted their Complaint alleging four causes of action. On August 14,
2002, this Court dismissed all claims of breach of warranty and compelled arbitration. The claim
of mutual mistake was likewise arbitrated. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment addresses only the remaining claims of fraudulent non-disclosure §nd fraudulent
concealment.
On September 29, 2003, a hearing was held to consider the issues raised by Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to the hearing, both parties submitted various memoranda
of points and authorities in further support of their positions. The Court has considered the
memoranda filed by the parties, the testimony provided at the hearing, the relevant case law and
statutory provisions, and being folly advised in the matter, issues the following ruling.

BACKGROUND
1.

Woodside Homes Corporation ("Woodside") owned land that became known as the
Panorama Point Subdivision ("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah.

2.

In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside hired the geotechnical

engineering firm currently known as Amec Earth & Environmental ("Amec") to conduct
an investigation of the soils in the subdivision and prepare a report.
3.

Amec's Report indicated that the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil
were moisture sensitive and collapsible and recommended the removal of this soil.

4.

On or about March 11,1995, Plaintiffs entered into a purchase agreement with Woodside
for the construction of a house on lot 304 of the Subdivision.

5.

Between six to eight feet of soil was removed from lot 304 during the construction of
Plaintiffs' house.

6.

William Gordon, an engineer at Amec, visited lot 304 during the construction of Plaintiffs'
house to inspect the soil removal. Mr. Gordon determined that the underlying soils would
support the house and made recommendations concerning the placement and compaction
of structural fill.

7.

Woodside understood that the soil excavation on lot 304 had removed all collapsible soils.

8.

Woodside followed the recommendations of Mr. Gordon before laying the foundation of
Plaintiffs' house.

9.

The Plaintiffs experienced cracking in the foundation of the house and settling of the
structure.

10.

Soil reports were also performed on land adjacent to the Plaintiffs' lot, including a report
conducted by Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. This report was conducted on land
originally owned by the LDS Church, which was later sold to Woodside.

11.

The LDS Church had planned to construct a large single structure that was different from
the single family homes being constructed by Woodside.

12.

The Delta report indicated the presence of six to sixteen feet of loose to medium density
silty sand.
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13.

The Delta report did not include an analysis of lot 304, the lot purchased by Plaintiffs.

14.

Woodside was not in possession of the Delta report until after the construction and sale of
Plaintiffs' house.
RULING
According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." After reviewing the pleadings and listening to
oral arguments, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
The only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had regarding collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot. The facts demonstrate that (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the
existence of collapsible soils on Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six
and eight feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting
the excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the
Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils engine^IiM&^tng the
foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after t£e completion of Plaintiffs'
house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils
on Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that would preclude
entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside.
In deciding whether Defendant, Woodside, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
Court considers two arguments brought by the Plaintiffs: (1) whether Woodside's conduct
constituted fraudulent non-disclosure, and (2) whether Woodside's conduct constituted fraudulent
concealment.
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I. Fraudulent Non-disclosure
In order "to support a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure a plaintiff must prove the
following three elements: (1) the non-disclosed information is material, (2) the non-disclosed
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to
communicate." Mitchell v. Christensenu 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001).
It is clear that the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information.
Therefore, to decide whether Woodside acted fraudulently, it must be determined if any nondisclosed information was known to them and whether they had a legal duty to communicate such
information to the Plaintiffs. Given the undisputed facts, this Court finds that Plaintiffs'
fraudulent non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to
show that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304. In fact, the soil engineer, Mr.
Gordon, indicated to Woodside that lot 304 was suitable for construction. Because Plaintiffs
cannot establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that
there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs.
II. Fraudulent Concealment
Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him."
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997).
There are no facts to indicate that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material
facts known to them. In fact, Woodside had no\knowledge of the possibility of remaining
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, because material facts were not known to them,
Woodside had no duty or obligation to communicate any such information and Plaintiffs' claim of
fraudulent concealment fails.
This Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20)
days of the date of this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature.

DATED this (0

day of October, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020402197 by the method and on the date
specified.
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